Thank you, yes in the end something either happens or it doesn't, although if one makes their predictions vague enough, that score can be increased. I'd go a bit further and say this article was more speculation on current motivations, but one that would be difficult if not impossible to falsify, therefore knocking it well clear of any s…
Thank you, yes in the end something either happens or it doesn't, although if one makes their predictions vague enough, that score can be increased. I'd go a bit further and say this article was more speculation on current motivations, but one that would be difficult if not impossible to falsify, therefore knocking it well clear of any sort of scientific category.
I certainly noticed your comments on Europe's military potential. Here we don't need to look into the future, what's happening today? Where are the arms this huge industrial base is producing? Why is roughly half of European military hardware purchases going to US-produced weapons? And if they try to reduce their purchases of or even boycott US arms, the Bad Orange Man can hit the kill switches on the billion dollar F-35's.
Industrial might does not automatically translate into military potential. I've written an article about the Garrison State concept and why girlbossery will struggle with implementing policies which empower rural and working class men.
A quick skim of history reveals that sheer population size, particularly in prosperous societies, doesn’t guarantee military prowess. Numbers alone can’t forge the cohesion, resolve, or adaptability needed to triumph in war. Ibn Khaldun, the 14th-century Arab historian, captured this in his concept of asabiyyah—a sense of group solidarity and shared purpose that binds a people together, often strongest in smaller, less pampered communities.
He argued that wealthy, populous societies grow soft and fragmented, losing the fierce unity that drives martial success, while leaner, hungrier groups wield asabiyyah like a blade. History backs this up with examples of small, determined forces toppling vast populations through grit and strategy.
The Spanish conquest of Latin America is a prime case—Hernán Cortés, with a few hundred men, brought down the Aztec Empire of millions in 1521, exploiting internal divisions and ruthless resolve.
The Mongol invasions further prove the point—Genghis Khan’s hordes, often outnumbered, swept through China and Persia in the 13th century, their mobility and ferocity overwhelming sedentary empires. Even the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae in 480 BCE, though ultimately defeated, held off a Persian army of tens of thousands, their asabiyyah-like brotherhood buying time for Greece.
Needless to say that Euro elites despise "toxic masculinity" and martial values and their war on European national pride means that very few high-T men are going to fight and die for a vague and bureaucratic supra-state called the EU. The only pools of asabiyyah Europe currently has--its nationalists--are systematically being mopped up by Brussels. Let's not forget the radical ideology, kept hidden in the media cellar, fuelling Ukrainian resistance to Russia!!
The claim that Europe’s supposed army of over a million well-trained soldiers has any true military potential against Russia ignores this lesson and oversimplifies a messy reality, especially when logistics enters the picture. Europe doesn’t have a unified army of that size—its militaries are fragmented across dozens of nations, with NATO’s European members collectively fielding around 1.5 million active personnel as of 2025.
But numbers mislead without the logistical backbone to sustain them, and here Europe leans heavily on America. Since NATO’s inception in 1949, the US has been the linchpin of alliance logistics—providing strategic airlift (think C-17 Globemasters), sealift capacity (via the Military Sealift Command), and prepositioned stocks of fuel, munitions, and equipment across Europe.
Without this, Europe’s ability to project and sustain a large force collapses. Take fuel alone: NATO’s Cold War-era pipeline system, once a marvel, has atrophied, and modern conflicts like Ukraine show that high-intensity warfare burns through supplies at a staggering rate—Russia’s been firing 10,000 artillery rounds daily at peaks, outpacing Europe’s production capacity. Europe’s domestic logistics are a patchwork—rail gauges differ, bridges can’t always handle heavy armor, and bureaucratic red tape slows cross-border movement.
The US fills these gaps with its global supply chain, from spare parts for F-35s (which Europe can’t maintain without Washington’s nod) to the sheer tonnage of ammo and gear shipped across the Atlantic. Again, the US has a kill switch for each and every European F-35 and the Bad Orange Man will not be shy about using them if he does not approve of Europe using them against Russia.
Now, let's speculate on Europe’s expeditionary potential without America. Let’s say Europe musters a force to confront Russia on the eastern front—Poland, the Baltics, maybe Ukraine.
A realistic ceiling might be 100,000–150,000 troops, roughly two corps, drawing from nations like Germany, France, and Poland, who’d lead the charge.
Equipment-wise, that’s about 500–700 main battle tanks (Leopards, Leclercs), 1,000 infantry fighting vehicles, and a few hundred artillery pieces (PZH 2000s, Caesars). Air support could lean on 200–300 fighters (Eurofighters, Rafales), but here’s the issue: sustaining this force beyond a few weeks is a nightmare.
Europe’s strategic airlift is thin—France and Germany have a handful of A400Ms, but nothing like the US’s 200+ C-17s. Sealift? Civilian ferries and a few roll-on/roll-off ships could move initial gear, but they’re slow and vulnerable. Ammo stocks are already low—Germany’s admitted it can’t supply Ukraine long-term, let alone itself—and domestic production (e.g., 155mm shells) lags far behind Russia’s.
And then there is Russia’s Oreshnik area saturation hypersonic missile system that is beyond the reach of Europe's already depleted air defense capacitates, and which will devastate any efforts to move troops or supplies towards Russia.
Meanwhile Russian irregular forces will infiltrate Europe's many teaming ghettos and start rallying locals to fight the oppressive system!
This is why I believe Europe is "fronting" on all this butch war pig talk and will fold like cheap suits when the pressure rises.
You make a number of good points. The weakest point of Western Europe in general is indeed the girlbossery and its lack of T-levels remaining ( Imean look at the boss of the NATO…if that is not a girl, then what is?). The Scandinavian, Eastern European and Baltic states are made of different material though. And what will Turkey do? No girlyboss, pretty high T-levels, good and large army, well established weapons industry. There are so many factors at play, it makes it hard to predict IMO. Well, ofc only if Europe at all manages to get its act together. If Europe does not show any success in that field sometime soon, it will never manage. Also, we may be looking at new vectors shaping the map. I for one do not (want to) believe Russia is very strong now and by the time it is again, Putin may not be around anymore. An organized Europe and a more moderate Russia might find each other as partners in that case. That is one of the possible outcomes too. Anyway, I realize this subject can lead to endless deliberations, so, thank you very much for the extensive answer. It was again enlightening!
Thank you, yes in the end something either happens or it doesn't, although if one makes their predictions vague enough, that score can be increased. I'd go a bit further and say this article was more speculation on current motivations, but one that would be difficult if not impossible to falsify, therefore knocking it well clear of any sort of scientific category.
I certainly noticed your comments on Europe's military potential. Here we don't need to look into the future, what's happening today? Where are the arms this huge industrial base is producing? Why is roughly half of European military hardware purchases going to US-produced weapons? And if they try to reduce their purchases of or even boycott US arms, the Bad Orange Man can hit the kill switches on the billion dollar F-35's.
Industrial might does not automatically translate into military potential. I've written an article about the Garrison State concept and why girlbossery will struggle with implementing policies which empower rural and working class men.
A quick skim of history reveals that sheer population size, particularly in prosperous societies, doesn’t guarantee military prowess. Numbers alone can’t forge the cohesion, resolve, or adaptability needed to triumph in war. Ibn Khaldun, the 14th-century Arab historian, captured this in his concept of asabiyyah—a sense of group solidarity and shared purpose that binds a people together, often strongest in smaller, less pampered communities.
He argued that wealthy, populous societies grow soft and fragmented, losing the fierce unity that drives martial success, while leaner, hungrier groups wield asabiyyah like a blade. History backs this up with examples of small, determined forces toppling vast populations through grit and strategy.
The Spanish conquest of Latin America is a prime case—Hernán Cortés, with a few hundred men, brought down the Aztec Empire of millions in 1521, exploiting internal divisions and ruthless resolve.
The Mongol invasions further prove the point—Genghis Khan’s hordes, often outnumbered, swept through China and Persia in the 13th century, their mobility and ferocity overwhelming sedentary empires. Even the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae in 480 BCE, though ultimately defeated, held off a Persian army of tens of thousands, their asabiyyah-like brotherhood buying time for Greece.
Needless to say that Euro elites despise "toxic masculinity" and martial values and their war on European national pride means that very few high-T men are going to fight and die for a vague and bureaucratic supra-state called the EU. The only pools of asabiyyah Europe currently has--its nationalists--are systematically being mopped up by Brussels. Let's not forget the radical ideology, kept hidden in the media cellar, fuelling Ukrainian resistance to Russia!!
The claim that Europe’s supposed army of over a million well-trained soldiers has any true military potential against Russia ignores this lesson and oversimplifies a messy reality, especially when logistics enters the picture. Europe doesn’t have a unified army of that size—its militaries are fragmented across dozens of nations, with NATO’s European members collectively fielding around 1.5 million active personnel as of 2025.
But numbers mislead without the logistical backbone to sustain them, and here Europe leans heavily on America. Since NATO’s inception in 1949, the US has been the linchpin of alliance logistics—providing strategic airlift (think C-17 Globemasters), sealift capacity (via the Military Sealift Command), and prepositioned stocks of fuel, munitions, and equipment across Europe.
Without this, Europe’s ability to project and sustain a large force collapses. Take fuel alone: NATO’s Cold War-era pipeline system, once a marvel, has atrophied, and modern conflicts like Ukraine show that high-intensity warfare burns through supplies at a staggering rate—Russia’s been firing 10,000 artillery rounds daily at peaks, outpacing Europe’s production capacity. Europe’s domestic logistics are a patchwork—rail gauges differ, bridges can’t always handle heavy armor, and bureaucratic red tape slows cross-border movement.
The US fills these gaps with its global supply chain, from spare parts for F-35s (which Europe can’t maintain without Washington’s nod) to the sheer tonnage of ammo and gear shipped across the Atlantic. Again, the US has a kill switch for each and every European F-35 and the Bad Orange Man will not be shy about using them if he does not approve of Europe using them against Russia.
Now, let's speculate on Europe’s expeditionary potential without America. Let’s say Europe musters a force to confront Russia on the eastern front—Poland, the Baltics, maybe Ukraine.
A realistic ceiling might be 100,000–150,000 troops, roughly two corps, drawing from nations like Germany, France, and Poland, who’d lead the charge.
Equipment-wise, that’s about 500–700 main battle tanks (Leopards, Leclercs), 1,000 infantry fighting vehicles, and a few hundred artillery pieces (PZH 2000s, Caesars). Air support could lean on 200–300 fighters (Eurofighters, Rafales), but here’s the issue: sustaining this force beyond a few weeks is a nightmare.
Europe’s strategic airlift is thin—France and Germany have a handful of A400Ms, but nothing like the US’s 200+ C-17s. Sealift? Civilian ferries and a few roll-on/roll-off ships could move initial gear, but they’re slow and vulnerable. Ammo stocks are already low—Germany’s admitted it can’t supply Ukraine long-term, let alone itself—and domestic production (e.g., 155mm shells) lags far behind Russia’s.
And then there is Russia’s Oreshnik area saturation hypersonic missile system that is beyond the reach of Europe's already depleted air defense capacitates, and which will devastate any efforts to move troops or supplies towards Russia.
Meanwhile Russian irregular forces will infiltrate Europe's many teaming ghettos and start rallying locals to fight the oppressive system!
This is why I believe Europe is "fronting" on all this butch war pig talk and will fold like cheap suits when the pressure rises.
You make a number of good points. The weakest point of Western Europe in general is indeed the girlbossery and its lack of T-levels remaining ( Imean look at the boss of the NATO…if that is not a girl, then what is?). The Scandinavian, Eastern European and Baltic states are made of different material though. And what will Turkey do? No girlyboss, pretty high T-levels, good and large army, well established weapons industry. There are so many factors at play, it makes it hard to predict IMO. Well, ofc only if Europe at all manages to get its act together. If Europe does not show any success in that field sometime soon, it will never manage. Also, we may be looking at new vectors shaping the map. I for one do not (want to) believe Russia is very strong now and by the time it is again, Putin may not be around anymore. An organized Europe and a more moderate Russia might find each other as partners in that case. That is one of the possible outcomes too. Anyway, I realize this subject can lead to endless deliberations, so, thank you very much for the extensive answer. It was again enlightening!