Desperately Seeking NATO Intervention?

Ukraine is marooned in Russia's Kursk region's archipelago of attrition while Russia breaks through the Donbass impasse and into open operational space towards the Dnieper River

Russia’s cakewalk in the Donbass

After being stripped bare of resources by their high command, Ukrainian defenses are crumbling under the pressure of a Russian offensive in the Donbass. For the past two years of war, Russia has made incremental gains, but only at a high cost in blood and iron. Today, however, the rapid pace of Russian advances is turning the Battle of Donbass into an unexpected cakewalk. The Ukrainian leadership has placed its Western partners in a dilemma by creating a void in the Donbass that either Russia or NATO must fill.

Russian forces are rapidly advancing west toward the key Ukrainian transport hub (rail and road) of Pokrovsk. Normally, Ukrainian troops and materiel pass through Pokrovsk on their way to the front lines in the southern Donbass. Once Pokrovsk falls to Russia, Ukrainian logistics will be severely impacted. However, since Ukraine has essentially halted the supply of reserves and ammunition to their troops in this critical sector, the situation is already dire. As a result, the capture of this logistical junction will be tempered by its diminished use, though it will complicate any orderly Ukrainian withdrawals that are likely to follow.

Russia captured the key town of Novohrodivka in just three days with minimal effort. Ukrainian observers reported empty trenches and abandoned fortifications that offered no resistance against the advancing Russian soldiers. Last year, capturing such a town would have taken at least four months and left it in ruins. However, recent videos of Russian-occupied Novohrodivka show the town largely intact.

Even Ugledar, which for two years has been a thorn in Russia's side and the site of several disastrous frontal assaults, is now under threat of encirclement. This key fortress town, once a small workers' hamlet with many Soviet-built midrise residential towers, has proven difficult to conquer. The resilience of communist-era concrete construction has frustrated Russian air force efforts to level these sniper nests, preventing any direct assaults on the town. Finally, someone in the Russian general staff devised a plan to launch pincer movements along both flanks, aiming to cut off escape routes out of Ugledar. This week, Russian forces captured the key flank-protecting town of Konstantinovka, which, like other recent conquests, remains mostly intact. Ugledar now faces a significant risk of operational encirclement, leaving its defenders with a stark choice: flee now or eventually die in place.

Indestructible Ugledar. The scene of much Russian bloodshed and humiliation; this town will be razed to the ground once captured.

Out of the large salient created by Russian offensives near Avdeevka, Russian forces are now beginning to sweep south and attack from the rear the parallel front lines ten kilometres to the east. This situation is the very definition of an operational crisis. Ukrainian troops along this front line, some still manning powerful fortresses that have remained intact throughout the war, will either flee or face encirclement. This entire front could collapse by the end of September.

Meanwhile, as the Russian salient expands west, there are only empty steppes between Russian armoured units and the Dnieper River behind Pokrovsk. September may witness World War II-style 'big arrow' sweeps, with Russia capturing large swaths of Ukrainian territory. Once Russian forces reach the Dnieper, they can pivot north to either block or destroy the bridges Ukraine uses to supply its troops in the east. With most Ukrainian armour and reserves currently being depleted in the Kursk region, each kilometre Russia advances north along the Dnieper will further destabilize the front in the northern Donbass and Luhansk regions. Eventually, Russian forces could be in a position to attack Kharkov from the southwest, where no defensive lines exist.

Many of these Russian advances are likely to unfold during the heat of the 2024 U.S. Presidential campaign. Meanwhile, as the two-year stalemate in the Donbass collapses, Ukraine’s quixotic incursion into Russia’s Kursk region is losing momentum and settling into a stalemate of its own.

Ukraine is stranded in an archipelago of attrition

In the Ukrainian-occupied zone of Kursk, the rapid advances made during the first week of the invasion have stalled, giving way to a brutal war of attrition. Ukrainian forces now find themselves in a vulnerable salient, desperately committing more resources to extend their flanks on both sides. With Ukraine’s fragile lines of communication—often dependent on a single road—supplying these troops with materiel and manpower is becoming increasingly difficult. Russian aviation and drones dominate the skies, targeting Ukrainian heavy armour and light equipment. Each pile of burning steel today means one less Ukrainian tank tomorrow to challenge Russia’s impending push toward the Dnieper. Russian artillery is finally in position and is now actively punishing any clustering of Ukrainian troops.

Russia is steadily building a formidable defensive force in Kursk, drawing reserves primarily from other regions of Russia. Some units have been transferred from the stalled Kharkov region, which is now a lower priority for Russia. The strategic intent behind Russia’s invasion of Kharkov was to ease the defensive burden in the Donbass by compelling Ukraine to shift troops to Kharkov. By invading Kursk, Ukraine has inadvertently advanced Russia’s strategic goals, further depleting Ukrainian reserves from the Donbass.

Ukraine claimed that the purpose of their invasion of Kursk was to draw Russian assets away from the Donbass. However, by all accounts, this strategy has failed. In fact, recent reports indicate that Russia has deployed five fresh brigades into the Donbass to reinforce the gains they are currently making.

The viability of this invasion will be determined in the coming weeks. If Ukraine manages to expand in both directions along the Russian border, it could secure its flanks, transforming the salient into more of a gradual hump. Russia’s strategy is containment; they will not rush to push Ukraine out of Russia under any circumstances. Even if today Ukraine decides to end its Kursk offensive to reinforce its crumbling lines in the south, Russia will not let them escape easily. Should Ukraine attempt to withdraw from Kursk, Russian troops will pursue them, not stopping at the border. Russia will likely invade the Sumy region, compelling Ukrainian brigades to remain engaged and fight. Russia intends to ensure these troops do not return to the Donbass.

Some pro-Ukrainian analysts are comparing the amount of territory captured by both sides and declaring the fronts a draw. This assessment is fundamentally flawed. Conquered territory only matters if it can be effectively held. Additionally, the intrinsic value of land is rarely equal. For instance, 100 square kilometres in Silicon Valley is not the same as 100 square kilometres in the Appalachian foothills. The area Russia is advancing into is rich in mineral resources and potentially vast lithium deposits, whereas Kursk, at most, offers timber, wild game, and a few excellent fishing spots. The strategic value of these territories is not comparable.

Moreover, it is widely believed that Ukraine will not invest the necessary blood and iron to hold Kursk. In sharp contrast, once Russian forces secure any territory in the Donbass, and assuming no devastating counterattacks occur in the coming weeks, those lands will become permanently Russian. Russia is capturing powerful fortifications in the Donbass, which will be nearly impossible for any future Ukrainian counterattacks to reclaim. In chess terms, Russia is temporarily conceding a pawn (Kursk) while securing a Bishop and a Rook (the Donbass). It remains to be seen whether Russia will next target Ukraine’s Queen (Odessa) or its King (Kiev).

Regardless of future tactical shifts in Kursk, the Ukrainians have effectively stranded 20,000 soldiers and substantial equipment on what amounts to a strategic desert island. The Russians are approaching the situation as if it were an oil spill, deploying containment measures to limit the spread. The current battles will determine the exact boundaries of this containment. The size of the area is of little concern to the Russians; the larger Ukraine’s presence in this archipelago of attrition becomes, the more troops it will have to allocate to defending this futile front. Once Russia successfully contains the threat, they can redeploy troops from Kursk to capture even more valuable Ukrainian chess pieces.

Plasticity in Ukrainian Lines

In my piece Quelling the Fire in Ukraine from March 2023, I explained how a successful war of attrition eventually degrades the opposing side. Eighteen months later, we are seeing the first signs that Ukrainian lines are indeed reaching the point of “plasticity” in the Donbass. What follows is a brief excerpt from Quelling the Fire:

Armies along a front line behave like structural beams. Constant loading on a beam induces small deflections as well as strain and fatigue. Gradually increasing force upon the beam leads to small incremental movements. Eventually though, if enough force is added, the beam will reach the point of plasticity. Catastrophe quickly follows as any additional force produces dangerous bending and eventual collapse. This is Russia’s goal in Ukraine, to induce the Ukrainian armed forces into a state of plasticity where Ukraine will either be forced to sue for peace or watch their armies collapse allowing the Russians free reign to occupy any areas they wish.

Concrete beam entering plasticity and at the point of collapse

Reducing your opponent to the point of plasticity means destroying their manpower, armaments, and fighting spirit. In wars between asymmetrically sized nations, the country with the smaller population must generate a higher kill ratio. With Russia having a population roughly five times that of Ukraine, a simple calculation shows Ukraine must achieve a 5:1 kill ratio to make their war effort sustainable. If the opposite were true, if five Ukrainians are dying for each Russian, then over time the war is untenable.

Many analysts see Russia’s modest territorial gains as a sign it is losing. However in a war of attrition, if capturing and holding vast areas of land mars an army’s kill ratio, such moves can lead to defeat. The objective is to hold strong positions which maximize enemy deaths while sparing your own fighter’s lives. The strategic defensive is the ideal configuration. Historically Russian armies have retreated and traded land for attrition. In Ukraine both the Kharkov and Kherson retreats by Russia changed the battlefield to ensure better kill ratios for Russian forces.

This means Russian offensives are effective—not if they take land—but if they induce Ukrainians into high-casualty defensive stands, as seems to be the case in Bakhmut.

Cause and Effect: Why Now?

While the current collapse in the Donbass does reflect some degree of plasticity, it appears to be, at least in part, intentionally orchestrated by the highest levels of the Ukrainian command. Lower-ranking Ukrainian officers are increasingly questioning the wisdom and loyalty of the Zelensky regime.

According to the Rezident Telegram channel, former Ukrainian Presidential advisor Oleksiy Arestovych:

Rumours are spreading among the troops (and this is the worst thing) that the Donetsk region is simply being surrendered by agreement with the Kremlin — and this is a sign of very serious demoralization.”

Rezident also reports that Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi has officially informed President Zelensky that the Donbass defenses are collapsing and that the Kursk invasion must either be called off or, at the very least, allow for transferring some reserves from the northern front to the Donbass. Zelensky has refused to compromise, insisting on maintaining and even expanding the Kursk offensive. Additionally, there are reports of Ukraine mobilizing troops in the southern Zaporizhia region for a potential assault on the local nuclear power plant currently under Russian control. Syrskyi has also proposed a flank attack into the large Russian salient from the north in the Vozdvizhenka area. To counter this threat, Russian forces will need to capture the highway out of Pokrovsk toward Konstantinovka near Chasiv Yar.

Possible Ukrainian counterattacks of the Russian salient towards Pokrovsk.

Advancing Russian troops in the Donbass are so surprised by the ease of their progress that even they suspect they might be walking into a trap. In the quote below, the Russian soldier refers to Ukrainians using the common slang term 'khokhols:'

The collapse of Ukrainian defensive capabilities in the Donbass is sudden and catastrophic, akin to an overloaded steel beam reaching plasticity. However, attributing this collapse solely to a shortage of manpower and ammunition is complicated by the large-scale transfer of troops from the Donbass to the Kharkov and Kursk fronts.

Human nature tends to interpret such dramatic changes as evidence of deliberate human agency and planning. Is Ukraine intentionally creating a battlefield crisis ahead of the U.S. election in November? What better 'October Surprise' than Russian troops bathing in the Dnieper River just weeks before the 2024 election?

Viewed through this lens, Zelensky’s seemingly irrational decision to redeploy reserves to less critical frontlines might be a strategic maneuver to pressure the West into decisive action. This apparent mutiny or strategic gamble suggests a hidden threat: Ukraine could choose not to defend Odessa, which would be a major setback for NATO’s ambitions in the Black Sea and Moldova.

Zelensky is preparing his “victory plan” which is of course a barely disguised plot to provoke such a massive Russian retaliation, that NATO will have to intervene.

So far, the West has only supplied Ukraine with missiles that have a range of up to 300 kilometres. The distance from Moscow to the nearest Ukrainian border is roughly 500 kilometres, meaning that even if Ukraine were granted permission to launch these missiles, they would have limited reach within Russia's vast territory.

Compounding this challenge is Russia's increasing effectiveness in shooting down U.S.-supplied ATACMS, as well as British Storm Shadows and French SCALP missiles. While air defense is never foolproof, Ukraine would likely need to launch ten of these valuable missiles to achieve a best-case scenario of two reaching their targets.

These missiles require Western assistance for precise targeting. However, in an effort to avoid escalation—which could risk a nuclear conflict—the U.S. has so far refused to help Ukraine target missiles within Russia's internationally recognized borders. Ukraine, on the other hand, appears intent on provoking an escalation that might compel the West to intervene as 'messianic saviours.'

Peace Prospects

The Kursk invasion has derailed any prospects for peace in Ukraine. Before the Kursk invasion, Ukraine was busy running an international public relations peace campaign. These initiative were based on Ukraine’s current war demands, which include a full Russian surrender, the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, $500 billion in war reparations, and the removal from power of President Putin, with his subsequent arrest and imprisonment at The Hague.

In June, Putin set forth Russia’s conditions that Ukraine must meet to initiate a ceasefire and begin peace negotiations. Ukraine must withdraw its forces from the parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts that it still occupies, formally renounce any future ambitions to join NATO, and the West must lift all sanctions against Russia. Once these three conditions are met, Russia will agree to a ceasefire and begin negotiations on Ukraine’s future military and governmental structure.

There is growing frustration among patriotic Russians with President Putin’s perceived leniency in handling the Ukrainian conflict. However, Putin is a far-sighted statesman who understands that his primary goal is to integrate Russia into the broader global community, particularly the BRICS+ multipolar bloc and the Global South. This often results in what appears to be a 'war by committee.' Bridges across the Dnieper remain standing, rail lines from Poland are still operational, allowing Western leaders to visit Kyiv and express support for Zelensky. While Russia has damaged much of Ukraine’s power grid, electricity still functions for much of the day, and internet networks continue to provide access to the wider world. The ports of Odessa still receive shipments, likely including Western arms. Russia has yet to employ anything approaching a total war, scorched-earth strategy across the Ukrainian steppes.

War is never total, and the complete destruction of the enemy is often a misguided approach. British military strategist Basil Liddell Hart offers the best—and most paradoxical—perspective on the purpose of war:

The object in war is to attain a better peace – even if only from your own point of view.

In architecture, the demolition of an existing building is merely the means to an end: creating a better more beautiful edifice in its place. However, perspective is important since what the architect deems better is often subjective and may not be shared by the general public. The same will be true on about the Ukraine that emerges following an eventual Russian victory.

Similarly, one might ask whether Japan and Germany are truly better off today as impotent vassals of the U.S. than they were as independent and virile nations. From the U.S. perspective, this arrangement was advantageous—until recently. Now, as the storm clouds of global conflict gather, the U.S. finds itself wishing it could revive some of the former martial spirit in these heavily dependent allies.

Liddell Hart's British partner in strategic innovation, J.F.C. Fuller, emphasizes the importance of considering the shape of future peace during a conflict. In his work The Conduct of War 1789–1961, Fuller uses Winston Churchill's errors to illustrate this critical point:

Three days after assuming the premiership, Churchill summoned the House of Commons for a vote of confidence in the new administration, and after offering its members ‘blood, toil, sweat and tears’, he declared his policy.

‘You ask’, he said, ‘What is our policy? I will say: It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us: to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our policy. You ask, What is our aim? I can answer in one word: Victory - victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be. . .. Come, then, let us go forward together with our united strength’.

In war, victory is never more than a means toward the end, and to the true statesman, the end of war is peace. This Churchill failed to understand until the eleventh hour had struck, when it was too late to make good the damage done. From 13th May [1940] onward, for him the war was to be ‘the defeat, ruin, and slaughter of Hitler, to the exclusion of all other purposes, loyalties, or aim.’

So it came about that, when in March 1948, he wrote the Preface of his great history, with remarkable honesty he describes to where ‘Victory at all costs’ had led a demented world: ‘The human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact that after all the exertions and sacrifices of hundreds of millions of people and of the victories of the Righteous Cause, we have still not found Peace and Security, and that we live in the grip of even worse perils than those we have surmounted.’

Churchill realized too late that imposing unconditional surrender on the Germans extended World War II to the benefit of the Soviets, who emerged from the conflict controlling half of Europe and with global acclaim for their role in defeating fascism.

For Russia to remain victorious over Ukraine, it will require more than battlefield successes; it must also dismantle the messianic mindset currently gripping Ukraine.

This mindset first emerged in Judea following Pompey the Great's capture of Jerusalem and the desecration of the Second Temple in 63 BC. In subsequent years, Judean zealots developed a belief in a supernatural messiah, a sort of anti-Pompey, who would come to earth to defeat the Roman oppressors and restore Judean independence. This belief made peace impossible between the militarily weak but spiritually strong Judeans and the militarily powerful but spiritually weak Romans, resulting in nearly two centuries of conflict, with each Roman victory bringing further devastation to Judea.

Zelensky, however, is not searching for a supernatural savior; he views his messiah as the U.S. and NATO. In a small way Zelesnky embraced his shadowy dark side by played the role of an anti-Putin by invading and occupying Russia. Perhaps his motivation in playing the mini-messiah was to show the West such an invasion was possible. In addition though, Zelensky believes that by manipulating the situation correctly, the 'white hats' in the West will eventually intervene and defeat Russia for him. This mindset only ever allows for short-term, tactical peace deals that serve as preparation for the redeemer's anticipated arrival. True, lasting peace is impossible under these conditions.

Russia understands this dynamic but faces the delicate challenge of striking a balance: they must defeat Ukraine just enough to shatter its messianic illusions, while avoiding actions that could provoke a NATO intervention and/or reduce Ukraine to a failed state that Russia must live next to for the decades that follow.