Second Battle of Kursk
Second Battle of Kursk
Russia suffers its worst invasion since Nazi Germany stormed her borders in 1941 but neither the West nor Ukraine want to talk about it.
Amid crumbling defensive lines in the Donbass, an elite Ukrainian brigade invaded Russia's Kursk region on August 6th, overrunning the lightly guarded border zone. Ukraine's strategic goal appears to be the capture of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), located roughly 60 kilometres from the Ukrainian border.
Speculation in both Ukrainian and Russian information circles suggests that this raid may be a diversion from a larger operation potentially aimed at recapturing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in southern Ukraine. Throughout 2024, Russia has conducted an air campaign against Ukraine's power infrastructure, leaving the Kyiv regime facing a severe energy shortage this winter. Capturing these two NPPs and a swath of Russian territory could provide Ukraine with bargaining chips in future peace negotiations and help increase its electricity-generating capacity enough to survive the coming winter.
Given the current state of combat in the Kursk area, with Russia deploying additional forces—including fighters from the Wagner Group—the Ukrainian operation appears to be reaching its culmination point. Capturing the Kursk NPP seems beyond the capabilities of the Ukrainian forces involved. Considering the Kursk region's limited strategic value and Ukraine's lack of air power, it is unlikely that Ukraine will commit the reserves necessary to hold this territory long-term, especially if Odessa or Kharkov come under threat in the future.
As of this writing, Ukrainian forces have gained a foothold in the Russian town of Sudzha. Despite what appears on paper to be a significant Ukrainian military success in the Kursk region, Western media has scarcely mentioned it. Perhaps the harsh geopolitical reality of American Stryker armored fighting vehicles crossing the Russian border isn't the image Western audiences should be shown as the regime tries to rally support behind Vice President Harris' feel-good presidential campaign? Or perhaps a raid to capture a nuclear power plant is not the type of conduct the US military wants to be associated with?
This is not the first Ukrainian incursion into Russia during the current war. Previous attempts involved squads of anti-Putin Russians and various foreign fighters crossing the border, but these operations were amateurish and short-lived, leading to embarrassment within the Ukrainian information space.
In stark contrast, this week's invasion of Russia by Ukrainian forces is a professional and well-planned operation, involving some of the best fighters who have survived the past two years of attrition. Large quantities of air defense systems, drones, engineering equipment, as well as tanks and armored personnel carriers, were diverted from the Donbass to support this mission.
One of the most surprising aspects of this incursion is the negative reception it has received from Ukrainian observers. Many commentators, who typically celebrate any Ukrainian success, have been critical of the Kursk operation. They see the collapsing defensive lines in the mineral- and coal-rich Donbass and realize that elite reserves and equipment were withheld from those battles to invade Kursk.
Even David Axe, a military analyst known for his strong pro-Ukrainian stance, could hardly conceal his scathing disapproval of what many see as a vulgar publicity stunt. Axe’s article in Forbes is a rare exception in the Western media's blackout of this invasion.
Yesterday, elements of at least two Ukrainian army brigades—apparently not including pro-Ukrainian Russian fighters, as we initially reported—exploited a gap in the defenses around the village of Sudzha, in Kursk Oblast on the Russian side of Ukraine’s northern border.
A day later, hundreds of Ukrainian troops from (at least) the 22nd and 88th Mechanized Brigades supported by artillery, drones and air defenses have marched nearly 10 miles into southern Russia, routing local Russian forces and capturing Sudzha along with several other villages.
It’s an impressive feat for an army that has been on the defensive for a whole year—and which has struggled to mobilize sufficient manpower to hold off relentless but costly Russian assaults all the front line in eastern Ukraine.
The Ukrainian army can’t fully staff the brigades defending front-line towns in the east—with dire implications for Kyiv’s efforts to hold onto the last free swathes of Donetsk Oblast. And yet, the army was able to assign two or more brigades to the Sudzha attack—and deemed the potential gains in this attack to be worth the potential cost.
“I’m still not sure what the goal here is,” wrote John Helin, a Ukraine expert with Finnish analysis group Black Bird Group. “According to unreliable reports, Ukraine has concentrated elements from two to four brigades in the area. These would be gravely needed in the east.”
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Ukrainian forces were stretched thin along the 700-mile front line in Urkaine before two, three or four Ukrainian brigades invaded Russia. Now they’re stretched even thinner. The danger of further Russian breakthroughs is growing, especially in the east.
Ukrainian commanders are gambling they can go on the attack in the north without suffering heavy casualties. But attacking out in the open is almost always costlier than defending from prepared positions.
“Offensive operations ... risk taking higher casualties than in defense—at a time when Ukrainian forces are stretched thin,” Lee wrote. “Ukraine needs to maintain a favorable attrition ratio given the manpower situation, so taking heavy losses in this operation could make it more difficult.”
Even more intriguingly, Kyiv has yet to announce or take credit for the invasion. The Ukrainian armored vehicles display triangular symbols, marking a first in the Ukrainian War. This tactic is reminiscent of the 'Little Green Men,'—masked soldiers in unmarked uniforms—whom Russia deployed in 2014 to seize control of Crimea. Russia's objective was to maintain plausible deniability in case the operation failed; it's unclear why Ukraine is adopting a similarly ambiguous approach in this invasion. One possibility is that if the goal was indeed to occupy the Kursk NPP and then threaten to destroy it as a form of blackmail, the Ukrainian government might want to maintain some distance from such actions.
Telegram channels associated with the Wagner Group claim that a large column of their fighters is heading toward Kursk to counter this invasion. Strategically, it might be advantageous for Russia to let this invasion linger, tempting Ukraine to funnel more reserves into what is ultimately a strategic dead end. Ukraine's reserve troops, previously scattered and fortified across the country, are difficult for Russia to target. However, if these reserves are concentrated into assault groups for the offensive in Kursk, they become easier for Russia to destroy.
A fitting historical parallel to Ukraine's Kursk gambit is the German attempt to reach Antwerp in the closing months of World War II, known as the Battle of the Bulge. In December 1944, as the Allies advanced confidently toward Germany, Hitler gathered a massive force of 400,000 men and 1,400 tanks, launching a surprise counteroffensive through the Belgian Ardennes during winter storms. The Germans nearly reached the city of Dinant, still 140 kilometers short of their North Sea objective. Had the offensive succeeded, it would have split the Allies in two and denied them the crucial port facilities of Antwerp.
The first Battle of Kursk, fought in 1943 between Germany and the USSR, was the largest battle in human history and ended in a Soviet victory, with combined casualties reaching a million and nearly 8,000 tanks destroyed. Today's sequel battle, however, is minuscule by comparison.
As of today, Ukraine’s disputed President Zelensky joins a small group of world-historical figures—such as Adolf Hitler, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Charles XII of Sweden—who have invaded Russia. While Napoleon captured Moscow, Hitler reached its suburbs, and Charles XII advanced to Poltava in eastern Ukraine, it appears Zelensky will also fall even shorter. Given that it now seems unlikely Ukrainian forces will reach the nuclear power plant and threaten to unleach a radioactive catastrophe, will the embattled leader at least claim responsibility for the invasion? Will he and his PR team cross the border for a photoshoot with Zelensky on occupied Russian territory inspecting his troops?