Behind Istanbul’s failed diplomacy: Western denial, Russian momentum, and Trump trapped between two walls. As defeat looms, the war party scrambles for exits, callously denying their legacy.
Trump knows the stubborn standpoints of the EU/Ukraine - and Russia for that sake. So what is the meaning of calling around?
It is not a matter of being on the side of the EU/Ukraine or Russia. Trump should know that the only sustainable solution is a reset to the neutral situation of Ukraine before the US-Kiev coup in 2014. All other solutions will fail and more Ukrainians and Russians will die. And waste of time.
The US still has the power to discipline its allied European warmongers and force a peace solution with a neutral Ukraine through if Trump/the US is willing to do so.
Trump is slowly learning that his negotiating skills are child like next to Putin or Xi. You can’t bluff these guys when you don’t hold the cards and the US does not hold the cards
Yes, Trump operates in the promotional world of professional wrestling—where perception is the product and the goal is to captivate the crowd. It's a realm of spectacle, narrative control, and emotional manipulation. By contrast, Xi and Putin resemble martial artists: disciplined, methodical, and rooted in the hard geometry of competitive advantage. When these two worldviews collide—promotion versus competition—those grounded in material reality tend to prevail. Bluff may win the crowd, but not the match.
When Trump proposes a deal that lets Ukraine walk away with a draw, he’s speaking like a promoter trying to script a crowd-pleasing outcome—where the “face” survives to fight another day. But Putin isn’t playing a role; he’s spent years shaping a war machine built to win. As victory nears, Trump’s appeals to narrative fall flat—irrelevant to a competitor intent on finishing the fight, not selling it.
It is refreshing look on a subject that is always portrayed the same way in conventional media outlets, so thanks for that!
Thant being said, this feels biased towards Russian point-of-view, as it ignores some weaknesses Russia has and some advantages Ukraine has, IMO.
I completely agree that "de-escalations are tenuous at best". But i tend to think each is a result of 2 sides agreeing that fighting now is not optimal, which is almost as good as it gets in world where world dominance is at stake.
I don't think Putin or Zelensky will sign anything because they fear Trump or were outmaneuvered by him. I think that if they do decide to de-escalate at some point, it will be because both came to same conclusion as others did, meaning: that fighting now is not optimal.
I don't think we're quite there yet. maybe 4 months of reduced oil revenues to Russia due to oil prices decline and reduced inflow of munitions to Ukraine from allies that are trying to re-stock - will make both feel like a break would be a good thing.
Thanks—but let’s be serious. Four months of reduced oil revenue will have virtually no effect on Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort. That’s a fantasy peddled by Western propagandists. Four years of sustained pressure might begin to have an impact, but even that’s uncertain.
Before the 2022 invasion, Russia’s foreign exchange reserves—including gold—exceeded $600 billion. Even with $300 billion frozen, the Central Bank of Russia has actively diversified its holdings, increasing its gold reserves and yuan-denominated assets to shield itself from sanctions. This buffer allows Russia to absorb short-term fluctuations in oil revenue with little strain.
Moreover, Russia continues to run a current account surplus—$19.8 billion in Q1 2025 alone—ensuring a steady stream of foreign currency to cover imports and war expenditures. With a debt-to-GDP ratio of just 20%, it also retains significant fiscal room to borrow if necessary, without triggering a financial crisis.
The real danger to Russian political stability will not come from economic pressure, but from internal backlash—if Putin misreads the strategic moment and prematurely tries to make a deal with the West.
about political stability in Russia: i think there's little chance of backlash from anyone at this point. I think we agree that Putin would like to appear an absolute winner internally - so that the casualties and strain of the last 3.25 years are somewhat justified.
The Ukrainian strategy is simple enough - offer no real concessions, negotiate as little as possible, and then run screaming to NATO that Russia does not want an end to the war. The plan ever always only was for NATO to come to the rescue, once the number of Ukrainians to soak up Russian munitions started to run low, and that the United States would get roped in, rather than leave their poodles hanging out to dry.
This plan is continuing apace. Zelenskii and his handlers are quite adept at presenting choices in which they win, either way.
Zelensky and his team have shown real skill in navigating the tactical terrain—adapting, messaging, and maneuvering to keep Western support alive. But tactics are not strategy. Staying the course only works if the road leads somewhere other than a Russian brick wall. Right now, their trajectory points to eventual collapse.
The moment for serious NATO intervention, if it ever existed, was the fall of 2022. That window has long since closed. What we’re witnessing now is an attempt to choreograph a controlled retreat—halting the conflict while conceding as little as possible. The truth is harder to face: the post-martial West, rich and rhetorically resolute, lacks the will or capacity to confront a peer adversary in full-spectrum war. The West has become fully promotional—loud with declarations, hollow in action. They move their mouths because their fists are too soft for the fight.
Trump knows the stubborn standpoints of the EU/Ukraine - and Russia for that sake. So what is the meaning of calling around?
It is not a matter of being on the side of the EU/Ukraine or Russia. Trump should know that the only sustainable solution is a reset to the neutral situation of Ukraine before the US-Kiev coup in 2014. All other solutions will fail and more Ukrainians and Russians will die. And waste of time.
The US still has the power to discipline its allied European warmongers and force a peace solution with a neutral Ukraine through if Trump/the US is willing to do so.
Trump is weak, stupid, and easily manipulated.
Trump is slowly learning that his negotiating skills are child like next to Putin or Xi. You can’t bluff these guys when you don’t hold the cards and the US does not hold the cards
Yes, Trump operates in the promotional world of professional wrestling—where perception is the product and the goal is to captivate the crowd. It's a realm of spectacle, narrative control, and emotional manipulation. By contrast, Xi and Putin resemble martial artists: disciplined, methodical, and rooted in the hard geometry of competitive advantage. When these two worldviews collide—promotion versus competition—those grounded in material reality tend to prevail. Bluff may win the crowd, but not the match.
When Trump proposes a deal that lets Ukraine walk away with a draw, he’s speaking like a promoter trying to script a crowd-pleasing outcome—where the “face” survives to fight another day. But Putin isn’t playing a role; he’s spent years shaping a war machine built to win. As victory nears, Trump’s appeals to narrative fall flat—irrelevant to a competitor intent on finishing the fight, not selling it.
It is refreshing look on a subject that is always portrayed the same way in conventional media outlets, so thanks for that!
Thant being said, this feels biased towards Russian point-of-view, as it ignores some weaknesses Russia has and some advantages Ukraine has, IMO.
I completely agree that "de-escalations are tenuous at best". But i tend to think each is a result of 2 sides agreeing that fighting now is not optimal, which is almost as good as it gets in world where world dominance is at stake.
I don't think Putin or Zelensky will sign anything because they fear Trump or were outmaneuvered by him. I think that if they do decide to de-escalate at some point, it will be because both came to same conclusion as others did, meaning: that fighting now is not optimal.
I don't think we're quite there yet. maybe 4 months of reduced oil revenues to Russia due to oil prices decline and reduced inflow of munitions to Ukraine from allies that are trying to re-stock - will make both feel like a break would be a good thing.
Thanks—but let’s be serious. Four months of reduced oil revenue will have virtually no effect on Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort. That’s a fantasy peddled by Western propagandists. Four years of sustained pressure might begin to have an impact, but even that’s uncertain.
Before the 2022 invasion, Russia’s foreign exchange reserves—including gold—exceeded $600 billion. Even with $300 billion frozen, the Central Bank of Russia has actively diversified its holdings, increasing its gold reserves and yuan-denominated assets to shield itself from sanctions. This buffer allows Russia to absorb short-term fluctuations in oil revenue with little strain.
Moreover, Russia continues to run a current account surplus—$19.8 billion in Q1 2025 alone—ensuring a steady stream of foreign currency to cover imports and war expenditures. With a debt-to-GDP ratio of just 20%, it also retains significant fiscal room to borrow if necessary, without triggering a financial crisis.
The real danger to Russian political stability will not come from economic pressure, but from internal backlash—if Putin misreads the strategic moment and prematurely tries to make a deal with the West.
I agree that i am biased by western media :)
about political stability in Russia: i think there's little chance of backlash from anyone at this point. I think we agree that Putin would like to appear an absolute winner internally - so that the casualties and strain of the last 3.25 years are somewhat justified.
From comments elsewhere:
The Ukrainian strategy is simple enough - offer no real concessions, negotiate as little as possible, and then run screaming to NATO that Russia does not want an end to the war. The plan ever always only was for NATO to come to the rescue, once the number of Ukrainians to soak up Russian munitions started to run low, and that the United States would get roped in, rather than leave their poodles hanging out to dry.
This plan is continuing apace. Zelenskii and his handlers are quite adept at presenting choices in which they win, either way.
Zelensky and his team have shown real skill in navigating the tactical terrain—adapting, messaging, and maneuvering to keep Western support alive. But tactics are not strategy. Staying the course only works if the road leads somewhere other than a Russian brick wall. Right now, their trajectory points to eventual collapse.
The moment for serious NATO intervention, if it ever existed, was the fall of 2022. That window has long since closed. What we’re witnessing now is an attempt to choreograph a controlled retreat—halting the conflict while conceding as little as possible. The truth is harder to face: the post-martial West, rich and rhetorically resolute, lacks the will or capacity to confront a peer adversary in full-spectrum war. The West has become fully promotional—loud with declarations, hollow in action. They move their mouths because their fists are too soft for the fight.
It is a NATO proxy war NATO has been defeated.
NATO obviously doesn't agree.