Gung-ho Girl Bosses, Interrupted

Working class men of the nation united to defeat Kamala Harris and her neoconservative war party cohort Liz Cheney. But will Trump's victory really spare American men from death in Donbass trenches?

The U.S. deep state is not a monolith. Like any human collective, America’s unelected, permanent bureaucracy—which acts as a stern counterweight to any form of popular exuberance—experiences its own internal factional tensions. This has become especially evident following nearly three years of geopolitical crisis, with the Ukraine War serving as a major inflection point that has led to a steep decline in U.S. influence and reputation. An increasing segment of the deep state now appears to be diverging from America's relentless moral crusades abroad. Replacing the current permanent revolution of American dominance, a more transactional relationship with the world may follow as the US concentrates on rebuilding capitalism in its own country. A divided deep state may partly explain the muted response from establishment forces to Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 Presidential election.

A vote for Kamala Harris would have been an endorsement of the Biden-Harris administration’s global campaign against “authoritarianism” in all its forms—except, conspicuously, those practiced by the U.S. and its allies. A Harris victory, especially given her collaboration with noted war hawk Liz Cheney, would signal continued public support for U.S. policies in Ukraine and Gaza. The only remaining path to a Ukrainian victory in its war with Russia may involve direct NATO intervention, which would entail working class American soldiers fighting in the trenches of Donbas.

Europeans, who are rarely shy about sharing their opinions on U.S. politics—and have a much larger stake in Ukraine—not surprisingly appear rather hesitant about sending their own sons east to confront Putin’s forces. With Trump coming to the helm, the generous geopolitical safety net the US provides Europe is potentially at risk. It’s thanks to US military power that European nations are able to maintain their increasingly grandiose geopolitical positions without direct sacrifices. For many Europeans, it’s preferable that American troops and taxpayers bear the brunt of Europe’s chronic weakness.

There’s a certain twisted logic to this perspective. Since both U.S. neoconservatives and Europe’s intellectual elite often look down on working-class Americans—especially those inclined to support Trump. And so sending these “malcontents” eastward to fight on the snowy steppes of Eurasia might seem convenient. Deploying those least aligned with elite ideals could serve two purposes: advancing geopolitical goals while killing off a group that policymakers and opinion leaders frequently view with disdain.

For proponents of this approach, the idea of sending working-class Americans into distant conflicts might seem like a double win: every casualty on the eastern front, whether Russian or “deplorable” American, might appear as a victory to the professional-managerial classes (PMC) on both sides of the Atlantic. Under these conditions, each death could be seen as a step toward stabilizing the elites’ vision of order, aligning both European and American establishments in their broader aims. However, despite Kamala Harris overwhelming financial backing from oligarchic interests—50% more than her opponent—enough American working-class men of all backgrounds united to reject the polished, “girl boss” rebranding of the same old war party, sheening with joy and invigorated by twerking celebrities.

But did working class American men make the right choice, especially considering the U.S. military’s current recruitment crisis? The reluctance to enlist is most pronounced among those who form the core of Donald Trump’s base—historically, the rural and working-class communities from regions like Appalachia, the Deep South, and the Ozarks. Traditionally, these areas have provided the military with some of its best fighters, and U.S. infantry has long been disproportionately white. Yet, as cultural divides deepen and the sentiment of a “culture war” against rural America intensifies, young men from these regions are increasingly hesitant to join the military. Many are discouraged from serving by their fathers, veterans themselves, who feel disillusioned by the direction of U.S. policy and culture.

Trump is the candidate most able to address the military’s recruitment and morale issues, since his base is made up of demographic groups that historically supply America’s soldiers. Harris, on the other hand, represents an effete coalition that rejects the military’s “warrior ethos.” Her victory would have deepen the alienation felt by the traditional warrior class in America, further discouraging enlistment. The reality is that “White Dudes for Harris”—often urban, highly educated, and repelled by military virtues—are unlikely to volunteer en masse for military service to support her gung-ho girl boss foreign policy. Which leaves the draft as the only option to corral white rural rage away from the professional-managerial class and towards Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

Trump’s Madman Theory 2.0

Trump embraces a "wildcard" persona in foreign policy, drawing on Richard Nixon's famous "Madman Theory" to create uncertainty around his true intentions and keep adversaries on edge. Projecting an unpredictable and sometimes aggressive stance, Trump hopes to make foreign leaders wary of pushing too far, lest he respond in an extreme or unexpected manner. By cultivating this image, Trump obscures his own dovish inclinations, which are influenced by non-interventionist ideas popularized by figures such as Ron Paul. While Trump often uses tough rhetoric and makes bold, headline-grabbing statements, his actual policies have frequently leaned toward reducing overseas military engagements and limiting costly U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts.

However, Trump’s use of the Madman Theory is a double-edged sword. It allows his anti-war supporters to rationalize moments of cognitive dissonance when he appoints war hawks like John Bolton and Mike Pompeo to senior positions. Worse, Trump’s openness about using the Madman Theory during his campaign rallies risks undermining its effectiveness in real-world situations, as it exposes his strategy to both allies and adversaries. This transparency could erode the credibility of his unpredictable persona, reducing the element of surprise and potentially limiting the strategy’s effectiveness in keeping global leaders on edge. As a result, Trump may find himself compelled to intensify his “madman” persona, possibly amplifying it to unstable extremes in order to maintain the intended deterrent effect.

The flipside of any "Madman Theory" is a “Peacenik Theory,” where Trump might be adopting an anti-war stance to gain the trust of his working-class, hardhat-wearing supporters—only to later send them into the trenches of Donbas. In this scenario, Trump’s anti-interventionist rhetoric would serve as a calculated façade, allowing him to rally blue-collar Americans around his cause while ultimately positioning them as front-line participants in a conflict overseas.

Gung-ho boy boss Mike Pompeo preaching forever war to his future cannon fodder?

In July, former CIA director and rabid neocon Mike Pompeo proposed a "Trump Peace Plan" for Ukraine. Since Russia is currently winning the war and sees little incentive to negotiate, Pompeo’s strategy requires creating a credible threat to force concessions from Putin. His proposal includes a $500 billion “lend-lease” program to supply Ukraine “with everything it needs.” This plan ignores the fact that US armouries are empty. Moreover, two major issues are evident with this plan. First, Ukraine is unlikely to repay the substantial loans it has already taken, let alone any new lend-lease debts. Second, what Ukraine needs most is not just more equipment, but more soldiers. Those hardhats rallying behind Pompeo at Trump events might be viewed by some as a worthy sacrifice to the gods of forever war.

Ron Paul himself expressed deep disappointment with Trump’s performance during his first term, particularly regarding Trump’s involvement in Ukraine. In an article written in December 2018, Paul demonstrated remarkable foresight about the dangers of Trump continuing the war party’s interventionist stance in Ukraine.

What is most disappointing about President Trump’s foreign policy is that it didn’t have to be this way. He ran on a platform of America first, ending foreign wars, NATO skepticism, and better relations with Russia. Americans voted for this policy. He had a mandate, a rejection of Obama’s destructive interventionism.

But he lost his nerve.

Instead of being the president who ships lethal weapons to the Ukrainian regime, instead of being the president who insists that Crimea remain in Ukraine, instead of being the president who continues policies the American people clearly rejected at the ballot box, Trump could have blamed the Ukraine/Russia mess on the failed Obama foreign policy and charted a very different course.

What flag flies over Crimea is none of our business.

In 2025, the burning question Trump may face is whose flag flies over Odessa.

There is reason to hope that Trump 2.0 will present a truly anti-neocon foreign policy. Trump has surrounded himself with an inner circle openly hostile to neoconservativism—JD Vance, RFK Jr, Tulsi Gabbard and Elon Musk. After days of heated speculation about Mike Pompeo joining his team, last night Trump issued a clear statement on the matter:

I will not be inviting former Ambassador Nikki Haley, or former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, to join the Trump Administration, which is currently in formation. I very much enjoyed and appreciated working with them previously, and would like to thank them for their service to out Country.

Looking ahead to the 2028 GOP primaries, it's almost certain that, representing the war party, Nikki Haley will challenge Vice President-elect J.D. Vance for the nomination. Currently, Vance is the favourite on betting sites to win the 2028 presidency, buoyed by a foreign policy stance that diverges sharply from traditional neoconservative dogma.

We have built a foreign policy of hectoring, moralizing, and lecturing countries that don’t want anything to do with it. The Chinese have a foreign policy of building roads and bridges and feeding poor people. And I think we should pursue a foreign policy, a diplomacy of respect, and a foreign policy that is not rotted in moralizing—it’s rooted in the national interests of this country.

Tulsi Gabbard, a former Democrat and Iraq War veteran, has long campaigned against neoconservatism. In 2019, she met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—a move that shocked the hawkish Democratic foreign policy establishment. Yet, as part of joining “Team Trump,” each of these heterodox foreign policy leaders, including Gabbard, has felt compelled to publicly take a knee for Israel.

If Gabbard were to be appointed to a senior position in a future Trump administration—such as Secretary of State—she could emerge as a leading candidate to join JD Vance as his vice-presidential pick for the 2028 election. This trajectory could position her as a strong contender to become the first female president of the US sometime in the 2030’s.

An optimist can imagine Trump playing more of a ceremonial role during this mandate while leaving the day-to-day details of governance to this inner circle.

Gaza and Trump

The Israeli attacks on Palestinians in Gaza played a significant role in Kamala Harris’s defeat. Donald Trump unexpectedly won the heavily Muslim city of Dearborn, Michigan, by promising to pursue peace in the Middle East. In response, Democrats argued that the situation in Gaza could have been even worse under Trump, suggesting that, thanks to Biden’s diplomacy, Israel’s actions were somewhat restrained. This line of argument implied that Biden/Harris’ “genocide with a smile” was preferable to anything that would occur under Trump. Muslim and leftist voters were not buying it.

From a systemic perspective, the current catastrophe in Gaza would have been unlikely under Trump, regardless of any wishes he might have had on the subject. With Trump as the face of Palestinian suffering—laughing on the podium, appearing dismissive of Gazan’s pain—the world would have reacted much more forcefully against Israel. The U.S. employs a geopolitical “good cop / Trump cop” dynamic. With the kinder, gentler Biden as the face of Israeli actions, much of the world has been reluctant to challenge the U.S., wary that any criticism of Biden or Israel might risk a second Trump term. This dynamic has led many countries to idealize Biden's leadership, even turning a blind eye to controversial actions like the Nord Stream pipeline attack, which contributed to the current economic and political instability in Germany.

When Trump is in the Oval Office, legacy media and European good thinkers often shift to what could be called “devaluation mode,” where every action he takes is intensely scrutinized and criticized. Under Trump, the media would likely amplify each bomb falling on Gaza or Lebanon, openly expressing moral outrage at his perceived indifference.

Biden plays a role akin to that of a well-meaning but enabling friend: supplying Israel with extensive military aid but attempting to restrain them from going too far. Trump, by contrast, would not only metaphorically giving Israel it car keys after a drinking binge but also encouraging them to go spin geopolitical doughnuts in a busy intersection. This approach casts Biden as a kind of super-ego, imposing some limitations, while Trump represents the unrestrained Id.

This dynamic forces Israel to manage its own restraint under Trump. Recently, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu dismissed his defense minister, who was aligned with the Democratic Party, thereby provoking tension with the Israeli military and intelligence services. With Biden soon out of the picture, Netanyahu may be tempting these institutions to launch a coup to counterbalance his aggressive stance. Israel's invasion of Lebanon has faltered, while Hezbollah’s rockets continue to rain down. Netanyahu’s unrestrained approach has led Israel into a complex, seven-front conflict, one that Trump may not feel compelled to limit. In turn this will force Israel’s military to step in as a controlling super-ego against Netanyahu’s rampaging Id.

Trump Versus the Primal Horde

Trump has provocatively claimed that, once elected, he will end the Ukraine war within 24 hours. At best, he could end U.S. involvement in the conflict, which might pressure Ukraine to accept Russia’s terms. Elon Musk recently joined a conversation Trump had with Ukrainian President Zelensky. Musk provides the Ukraine military with a vital communication system. Trump threatening to cut of their funding and Musk blocking Ukrainian access to the Starlink would effectively force Ukraine to accede to Russian demands. If these threats were indeed made, then there is a chance a peace treaty on Russian terms could be signed on Trump’s inauguration day.

However, this morning Ukraine launched a 40 drone attack on Moscow, targeting its international airport, which may be seen as an expression of defiance to any ultimatums Zelensky may have received from Trump.

Nevertheless, in no realistic scenario will Trump possess any true leverage over the increasingly victorious Russians. In fact, Russia holds several trump cards in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula that could further complicate matters. Russia has the ability to supply more advanced weapons to Iran and its proxies, and could encourage North Korea to escalate tensions with South Korea. These actions underscore the greatest strategic threat facing the U.S. today: what I call the "Primal Horde"—a coalition of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, along with their allies in the expanding BRICS trading bloc.

Such an alliance is baked into the Biden Administration’s “autocracy versus democracy” narrative. In 1997, U.S. geopolitical grandmaster Zbigniew Brzezinski warned of the dangers a Primal Horde grouping could pose to U.S. global leadership, though he never imagined that North Korea and the BRICS+ would eventually become part of this formidable coalition:

Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an "antihegemonic" coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances. It would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower. Averting this contingency, however remote it may be, will require a display of U.S. geostrategic skill on the western, eastern, and southern perimeters of Eurasia simultaneously. (The Grand Chessboard, p. 55)

Today, as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other rising powers align within the BRICS+ framework, this scenario is no longer theoretical—it is a growing reality that the Biden administration has only managed to exasperate.

Since the winter of 2022, events have shown that the U.S. faces substantial difficulties in countering an alliance of powerful “revisionist” nations, which have begun to act in coordinated unity. This tight-knit coalition has proven to be strategically cohesive, making it difficult for the U.S. to single out individual countries for diplomatic or military pressure. For the U.S. to regain an advantage, its best hope might lie in dissolving the ties binding these nations, allowing it to confront each separately. In a scenario reminiscent of a classic kung fu storyline, where the protagonist tackles each opponent individually, the U.S. might find it easier to deal with these adversaries one by one rather than as a formidable bloc.

The “Primal Horde,” however, is aware of this risk. Leaders in Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea understand that separating from each other could render each nation vulnerable to U.S. pressure. In response, they have actively strengthened alliances: Russia recently entered a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with North Korea and is expected to sign a similar agreement with Iran by the year’s end. Russia and China’s “no-limits” pact, signed in March 2024, further underscores their resolve to maintain unity against U.S. influence. Each of these moves reflects a shared understanding of their collective security, keeping them bound in a mutual resistance against a “Primal Father” in the form of the U.S.

This primal fear and resentment, much like the themes in Sigmund Freud’s “Primal Horde” myth, fuels their alliance against the tyrannical father figure—the U.S. For Trump or any American leader, dismantling this unity would be an enormous challenge, with chances of success close to zero. Nevertheless, a starting point might involve ending ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. An even more unconventional approach might be for the U.S. to apply for membership in BRICS, signalling a desire to engage collaboratively rather than antagonistically with this powerful coalition.

Trumpism: Capitalism in One Country?

There are growing signs that the deep state is beginning to recognize the emerging threat posed by the Primal Horde’s alliance of revisionist powers. This recognition is likely to divide the deep state into two divergent factions. On one side, the neoconservatives, who draw inspiration from the ideas of Leon Trotsky, advocate for a permanent global revolution. While Trotsky envisioned this revolution as a proletarian uprising, a closer reading of Marx reveals that the ultimate goal was not merely a class revolution but a global capitalist transformation. Marx believed that capitalism must "nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere," and understood that this could only be achieved through force. Just as neoconservatives today argue for the imposition of democracy and capitalism by military means, Marx argued that capitalism would metaphorically need “heavy artillery” to batter down all barriers and force resistance—whether from “Chinese walls” or the “barbarians” who resisted foreign influence.

What neither Marx nor the neoconservatives foresaw, however, was the potential for these so-called “barbarian” nations—today more politically correctly referred to as “authoritarian regimes”—to not only resist this capitalist expansion but to eventually band together and hijack capitalism for their own purposes. Rather than being crushed under the weight of Western imperialism, these nations have learned to adapt and co-opt the very system that was supposed to subjugate them. In doing so, they are able to challenge the global order that the U.S. and its allies once dominated, creating an increasingly potent bloc that is using capitalism and global trade to advance their own strategic interests, all while remaining politically and ideologically distinct from the Western liberal democratic model.

Following Lenin’s death, Trotsky famously lost his power struggle for control of the Soviet Union to the bureaucratic genius of Josef Stalin. Faced with leading a backward, undeveloped nation, Stalin was forced to jettison the cosmopolitan Marxist playbook under pressure to pull his nation out of poverty, all while being surrounded by mortal enemy nations, all seeking to destroy this threat to oligarchic Western dominance. And so Stalin developed the admittedly heretical nationalist concept within the Marxist realm of ideas of “Socialism in One Country.”

All nations, throughout history, have grappled with the dialectical tension between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. This dynamic reflects the fundamental struggle between a nation’s desire to maintain sovereignty, preserve its cultural identity, and secure economic independence, on the one hand, and the forces of global integration and interconnectedness, on the other. In recent decades, America has tilted too far toward the cosmopolitan ideal of globalization, adopting policies that have outsourced manufacturing, hollowed out industrial sectors, and diminished national self-sufficiency. As a result, the country’s once-thriving industrial base has eroded, leaving behind a weakened economic foundation and a populace divided by economic decline and social fragmentation.

To counter the forces driving perpetual foreign interventionism and the neoconservatives’ vision of a permanent revolution, Trump—or any leader seeking to rebuild American power—would need to embrace a form of "Capitalism in One Country." Drawing from the principles of economic self-sufficiency, this strategy would focus on revitalizing U.S. industry, re-establishing domestic manufacturing, and reducing dependency on foreign labour and resources.

American System 2.0

In the early 1970s, after President Richard Nixon closed the gold window, effectively transforming the U.S. dollar into a purely fiat currency, heterodox economist Michael Hudson authored a brilliant analysis on how this monetary shift could be exploited by U.S. financial elites. Unfortunately, he titled his book Super Imperialism, which lends it an overly strident tone. In a recent German translation, Hudson retitled it much more appropriately as Monetary Imperialism. In the introduction, Hudson outlines the contrasting economic visions of the two political parties that shaped America in the years before World War II.

The United States has always had a unique perception of its place and role in the world, and hence of its self-interest. America’s isolationist and often messianic ethic may be traced back to the 1840s. Spokesmen for American industrialists prior to the Civil War - the American School of political economy led by Henry Carey, E. Peshine Smith and their followers - believed that their nation’s rise to world power would be achieved by protecting their economy from those of Britain and other European nations. The objective was to create nothing less than a new civilization, one based on high wages as a precondition for achieving even higher productivity advantages. The result would be a society of abundance rather than one whose cultural and political principles were based on rentier classes ruling an economy of scarcity.

The idea that America needed an ever-receding western frontier was voiced by Democrats, motivated largely by the Slave Power’s desire to expand cotton cultivation southward into the Caribbean, while promoting westward territorial expansion to extend wheat-growing to provide low-priced food for its slave labour. The Democratic Party’s agenda was to reduce tariffs and rely largely on food and raw materials exports to buy manufactures from abroad (mainly from Britain). By contrast, Republican protectionists sought to build up a domestic market for manufactures behind tariff walls. The party’s industrial advocates focused on technological modernization in the eastern urban centers, from Pennsylvania up through New York to New England. (Super Imperialism, p. 1-2)

The pre-Civil War alliance between slaveholders and Wall Street to exploit cheap labour and champion free trade bears striking similarities to the modern Democratic Party's support for high levels of immigration and free trade policies. Just as Southern slaveholders and Northern financiers once joined forces to sustain a labour system based on exploitation, today’s Democrats often advocate for policies that facilitate a steady supply of low-cost labour through both legal and illegal immigration. Just as abolition of slavery was held to be impossible due to economic realities—that cotton would rot in the fields—abolition of the exploitation of non-citizen labour is held to be fundamental impossible due to economic necessity. Exploiting those without full citizenship rights only benefits large corporations that profit from lower wages and a more docile labour force.

To be fair, in his first term, Trump presented a grandiose and unrealizable solution to the issue of illegal immigration: building a massive border wall. However, had he chosen a more targeted administrative approach—by mandating the use of the E-Verify system, for example—he could have curtailed illegal employment far more effectively and immediately. E-Verify would make it significantly harder for employers to hire undocumented workers, reducing the economic incentives for illegal immigration. This is another example of Trump selling his working class voters on a vision, only to later bow to oligarchic pressure for abundant flows of cheap labour. And yet attitudes towards illegal immigration have hardened during the past eight years.

In 2024, Trump is campaigning on an American System 2.0, characterized by high tariffs and policies that prioritize a high standard of living for Americans. The American System 1.0 used protective tariffs, government-supported infrastructure, and support for American industry to nurture a self-sufficient and prosperous domestic economy. This approach drove industrial growth and economic independence for the U.S. in its formative years, allowing American workers to enjoy rising wages and a stable standard of living without direct reliance on global markets.

A century ago, this strategy helped establish the U.S. as an industrial powerhouse and secure middle-class prosperity. If adapted carefully, the principles of the American System could still be effective today. By raising tariffs on foreign goods and reinvesting in American industries and infrastructure, it’s possible to revive domestic manufacturing, reduce reliance on international supply chains, and create high-quality jobs for American workers. While the world economy has changed dramatically, the basic premise—focusing on national economic strength and self-sufficiency—remains a compelling alternative to the globalized economic model that often puts American workers in direct competition with lower-wage economies.

Implementing a modernized "American System 2.0" brings with it significant risks and complexities, particularly given the fundamental shifts that would be required to rebalance the U.S. economy. For decades, the United States has consumed far more than it has produced, relying on imports, debt, and an increasingly service-oriented economy to maintain its high levels of consumption. This economic imbalance is unsustainable, and, sooner or later, the forces of global finance, trade, and productivity will push the U.S. toward a necessary correction.

The core question, then, is how will this rebalancing take place? The United States can choose to take proactive measures, leading the transition to a more self-reliant and production-focused economy, but this path would require strategic adjustments in trade policies, industrial policy, and labour practices. Alternatively, if the U.S. remains passive, the rest of the world could eventually reverse the situation independently, imposing a new economic order that could leave the U.S. vulnerable to external pressures and constrained in its consumption habits. Inflation, the issue Trump rode to power on in 2024, is always a possibility in when introducing a high tariff regime.

American System 1.0 was rooted in what was to become a Fordist paradigm, but imagining the future requires conceptualizing a “Muskism” model that takes into account automation, demographic decline and above all the imperative to stymie the massive power of parasitical finance. If the US ever wants to return to competitiveness, parasitic rent-seeking must collapse. Rentier extraction drives labour costs higher while lowering standards of living. As workers are forced to pay more for essentials like food, housing, healthcare, education, and entertainment, the economy becomes increasingly uncompetitive on a global scale. An ideal scenario would be a conflict between warring oligarchs in finance and production, a tension that surfaced in the recent election.

The financial oligarchs will not go quietly into the dark. Their entrenched power and influence, built on a system of rent-seeking and financial extraction, means they have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Any movement toward a more prosperous, self-sufficient America—one that reduces reliance on foreign markets and focuses on production rather than consumption—represents a direct threat to their parasitic cash flows. These elites, who have flourished by capitalizing on global trade imbalances, financial manipulation, and the exploitation of cheap labour, will fight tooth and nail against any reforms that challenge their control.

However, the financial oligarchs may face a formidable and unexpected enemy: elements of the national security deep state aligning temporarily with Trump. The Pentagon will be well aware of the dire state of US weapon stocks. The high priests of war will well understand that the financialization of America is hollowing out US military potential.

Warring Oligarchs

The 2024 Presidential election indeed played out as a battle between competing factions of oligarchs, each vying for control over the future direction of America. On one side were the finance oligarchs, represented by figures like George Soros and the powerhouses of Wall Street, who have long maintained their grip on the U.S. financial system through lobbying, deregulation, and market manipulation. On the other side, are the tech oligarchs, including Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, and David Sachs, who represent the new wave of Silicon Valley billionaires, often wielding their influence through digital platforms, innovation, and a more libertarian economic outlook. These two factions have different visions of America’s future, but both seek to maintain and expand their respective control over the nation’s economic and political systems.

Forbes tiptoes around the issue by labelling US oligarchs as “high-earners” and failing to mention the massive financial support Soros and Wall Street provide to the Democrats. And yet, reading between the lines, they do allude to the 2024 Presidential election as a warring oligarchs scenario:

This is in stark contrast to March of 2016, when a meeting of “Oligarchs United” was held to explore ways to undermine Trump:

Billionaires, tech CEOs and top members of the Republican establishment flew to a private island resort off the coast of Georgia this weekend for the American Enterprise Institute's annual World Forum, according to sources familiar with the secretive gathering.

The main topic at the closed-to-the-press confab? How to stop Republican front-runner Donald Trump.

<…>

Apple CEO Tim Cook, Google co-founder Larry Page, Napster creator and Facebook investor Sean Parker, and Tesla Motors and SpaceX honcho Elon Musk all attended. So did Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), political guru Karl Rove, House Speaker Paul Ryan, GOP Sens. Tom Cotton (Ark.), Cory Gardner (Colo.), Tim Scott (S.C.), Rob Portman (Ohio) and Ben Sasse (Neb.), who recently made news by saying he "cannot support Donald Trump."

A key strategy for improving the lot of the people is to effectively divide and weaken these oligarchic factions, preventing any single group from consolidating too much power. Historically, when elites are too unified, they are able to impose policies that benefit themselves at the expense of the broader public. However, when these factions are in conflict, the opportunity arises for the working and middle classes to gain leverage. By fostering divisions between the financial elites and the tech giants, and creating a balance of power that limits the influence of any one group, it is possible to weaken their hold on the political system. This would allow for policies that prioritize the needs of everyday Americans over the interests of a small, powerful few. To challenge the oligarchs, the people must be able to exploit the rivalries between these elites, leveraging their conflicts to push for a more equitable and just society.

From the perspective of the American public, the 2024 Presidential election signalled a possible shift towards "dividing and ruling" the country’s entrenched oligarchic power structures. In an era when major industries, from finance to tech, hold significant sway over politics, seeing factions within the elite come into conflict represents an opportunity for everyday citizens to leverage these divides. By pitting oligarchs with competing interests against each other, there may be more chances to redirect focus toward policies that serve the public good rather than elite interests alone.

Moreover, the deep state’s increasingly fragmentation—with internal divisions over foreign policy, economic strategy, and national priorities—provides further cause for optimism.